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Lender Control Liability Functional Examination: the Firm and
Heuristics
I. Introduction
Control is one of the most important and commonly used concepts in corporate
governance. Nonetheless, the definition of the concept has proved impossible to define
with precision. This difficulty has not stopped researchers from investigating how to
allocate control in firms. Since the extant work of Aghion and Bolton, 1 the finance
literature suggests that control should contingently be assigned to creditors in distressed
firms as a way to limit agency costs. As a matter of fact, it is common to see in the
financial literature the assumption that violation of debt covenants generates shifts in
control. 2 Some legal scholars in the United States have recently supported this view, both
descriptively and normatively. Baird and Rasmussen, 3 as well as Skeel,4 have argued that
control shifts to creditors in distressed firms and that such shift is indeed beneficial from
an efficiency standpoint.
This position stands in stark contrast to the recent experience in the United
Kingdom which led to the adoption of the Enterprise act of 2002. This act has, for the
most part, abolished the administrative receivership, which had drawn concern due to the
perceived lack of transparency and accountability. 5 Armour and Mokal describe the

1

See Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting”, 59
Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992).
2
See Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts “How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt
Covenants”,
forthcoming
Journal
of
Finance,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=854324 (last visited 2/1/08), at 2 (“However, the instant
that the borrower's net worth falls below this threshold, regardless of the amount, control rights shift to the
creditor …” “…transfer of control rights accompanying a covenant violation leads to a significant decline
in investment activity, as creditors intervene in order to thwart inefficient investment or punish managers
for perceived misbehavior”). For an exception, see Gary Gorton & James Kahn “The Design of Bank Loan
Contracts”, 13 Review of Financial Studies 331, 359 (2000) (“The firm sometimes has an incentive to
increase volatility. The outside claimant that is in a position to prevent this, the bank, only imperfectly
controls borrower risk-taking”)
3
See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “The End of Bankruptcy”, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002).
4
See David A. Skeel, Jr. “Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11”, 152 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 917 (2003).
5
Unsecured creditors were viewed as the main constituency suffering from the administrative receivership
consequences. See Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance, Cm 5234, London, TSO
(2001), 9.
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administrative receivership as being “widely regarded as giving an unhealthy amount of
power to creditors holding floating charges, who because of their secured status lacked
sufficient incentives to rescue failing companies.” 6
In this paper, I consider the implications of allocating control to a lender. Drawing
inferences from the literature on the theory of the firm, I uncover the existence of lender
control costs beyond conflict of interests due to claimholders with priority differences.
The priority differences’ cosmology stems from a view of the firm as composed by
explicit contracts. Breaking away from that paradigm allows us to identify other sources
of lender control costs not tied to priority differences between classes of claimholders.
Specifically, I show that even when there is only one class of legal claimholders, lender
control may generate suboptimal results due to the suboptimal investment incentives that
parties not fully covered by explicit contracts may have.
In addition, I argue that broadening the definition of the firm sheds light on the
role of lender control and functionally related theories (i.e. equitable subordination) of
liability. These theories had been criticized by academics and practitioners alike due to
the dire consequences they pose on lending, 7 while their role has been dwarfing. In
particular, widening the definition of the theory of the firm allows us to visualize that
lender control liability should serve to penalize self-serving behavior which runs counter
to the optimal use of the assets.
Finally, I discuss the strict nature of lender control liability and its relation to
cognitive errors. The ordinary understanding is that lender control triggers harmful strict
lender liability. Therefore, lender control liability should be heavily limited or even

6

See John Armour & Rizwaan J. Mokal “Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise
Act of 2002”, Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28, 29 (2005). This perception of
inefficiency grew despite the existence of the so called ‘London Approach”, where secured creditors
wouldn’t press for insolvency under the threat of losing future business. See John Armour & Simon Deakin
“Norms in Private Insolvency Procedures: The ‘‘London Approach’’ to the Resolution of Financial
Distress”, 1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 21 (2001)
7
See, for example, John C. Joyce “Lender Liability: The Problem Is still with Us”, 115 Banking L. J. 477,
483 (1998); J. Dennis Hynes “Lender Liability: The Dilemma of the Controlling Creditor”, 58 Tenn. L.
Rev. 635 (1991).
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suppressed so that the efficient lending is not precluded. I argue that the strict nature of
lender control liability may avoid inefficiencies deriving from hindsight bias, but that
hindsight is not the only cognitive error distorting adjudicators. A closer look at
anchoring’s role in damage assessments, permits to refocus policy recommendations and
help explain the shortcomings of strict liability in this context.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II, discusses the predominant as well as
competing theories of the firm and their implications for lender control evaluations. Part
III, presents a model to show lender control costs even when there’s only one class of
legal claimants to the firm assets. Part IV, investigates rationales behind the dwarfing role
of lender liability theories in the United States and argues that it is in part due to the
misconception that freedom of contracts will always generate socially optimal results.
Part V, shows that fears of adjudication errors due to hindsight bias in the context of
lender control liability theories are somewhat misplaced and that policy oriented
recommendations should focus not only on hindsight bias but also on anchoring. Part VI
provides concluding remarks.

II. The Explicit Nexus of Contracts Paradigm
Knowing what constitutes a firm is important, both for healthy and distressed
firms, as a way to understand whether it is beneficial to have a firm and whether
allocation of control influences efficiency. 8 Originally, the firm was viewed in terms of
the technological transformations a firm was capable of doing, 9 focusing on the
maximization of the production function of the firm. 10 Milgrom and Roberts suggest that
8

In previous work, I have discussed extensively different theories of the firm and their implications for
value and control. See Sergio A. Muro “Bankruptcy Control and the Theory of the Firm”, unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author.
9
See Sidney G. Winter “On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation”, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization 163, 164 (1988). For an early presentation of the neoclassical viewpoint, see Jacob Viner
“Cost Curves and Supply Curves”, 3 Zeitschrift für National-ökonomie 23 (1932). Hart considers that “A
manager presides over this production set, buying and selling inputs and outputs in a spot market and
choosing the plan that maximizes owners' welfare.” See Oliver Hart “An Economist’s Perspective on the
Theory of the Firm”, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1757, 1759 (1989).
10
See Sidney G. Winter “On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation”, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization 163, 164 (1988). Holmstrom and Tirole argue that the theory of the firm in neoclassical terms
just asked “what forces ensure that the process will maximize profits”. See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean
Tirole “The Theory of the Firm”, 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization 61, 63 (1989).
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this “neoclassical theory” looked at market failures in competitive environments to find
reasons for non-market organizations (i.e. market power, increasing returns to scale,
externalities, coordination problems, etc).11
Later advances replaced this conceptualization by what Zingales refers to as the
“explicit nexus of contracts theory”, 12 which is the prevalent view of the firm in
corporate finance. 13 It originated with Alchian and Demsetz’s 14 study where input from
different individuals cannot be verified while output can. As free riding would emerge,
their solution involved allowing one person to monitor the venture, pay the other
individuals fixed amounts and receive all the residual claims from the firm. 15 Jensen and
Meckling 16 contributed greatly to this approach by describing the firm as a legal fiction
tying a set of contractual relations together. 17 As a result, the firm boundaries’ are set by
the costs the monitor incurs in controlling that the agents perform according to the
contracts. 18
As all contracts are assumed to be explicit, the explicit nexus of contracts theory
considers that each constituent, except for the shareholders, is fully paid its opportunity
cost. Therefore, a firm cannot be worth more than the sum of contracts it unites 19 and
11

See Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT, Prentice
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1992), at 73-7.
12
See Luigi Zingales “In search for New Foundations”, 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1630 (2000).
13
See Luigi Zingales “In search for New Foundations”, 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1630 (2000).
14
See Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz “Production, Information Costs and economic Organization”, 62
American Economic Review 777 (1972).
15
See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole “The Theory of the Firm”, 1 Handbook of Industrial
Organization 61, 67 (1989).
16
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure”, 4 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976).
17
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure”, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 311 (1976).
18
Jensen and Meckling define an agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves
delegating some decision making authority to the agent.” See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling
“Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, 3 Journal of Financial
Economics 305, 308-11 (1976). Then agency costs are composed of “1. the monitoring expenditures by the
principal, 2. the bonding expenditures by the agent, 3. the residual loss.” See Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, 3
Journal of Financial Economics 305, 322-3 (1976).
19
See Luigi Zingales “In search for New Foundations”, 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1631 (2000). In Jensen
and Meckling words “The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a
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shareholders, as only residual claimants, need to be allocated the decision rights. 20 In the
same vein, only shareholder interests should be pursued by the firm. As a corollary
consequence, in order to value the firm, computing only legal claims’ prices is relevant. 21
The explicit nexus of contracts theory is widespread through law academia and
court opinions. For example, in the law literature, Easterbrook and Fischel, when they
discuss voting, consider that “The right to vote is the right to make all the decisions not
otherwise provided by contract – whether the contract is express or supplied by legal
rules”, 22 implying that residual powers need merely be with the only class possessing
residual rights: the shareholders. As for judicial decisions, an example can be observed in
the recent opinion Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 23 where
the Chancery Court of Delaware while considering the existence of duties towards
creditors in vicinity of insolvency expressed that “So long as directors are respectful of
the corporation's obligation to honor the legal rights of its creditors, they should be free to
pursue in good faith profit for the corporation's equityholders”, 24 implying that other
constituents besides shareholders are paid their full opportunity cost.

nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual
claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without permission of
the other contracting individuals. Although this definition of the firm has little substantive content,
emphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations focuses attention on a crucial
set of questions—why particular sets of contractual relations arise for various types of organizations, what
the consequences of these contractual relations are, and how they are affected by changes exogenous to the
organization. Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things that are “inside”
the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are “outside” of it.” See Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,
3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 311 (1976).
20
Esaterbrook and Fischel consider that “As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the
appropriate incentives (collective choice problems to one side) to make discretionary decisions… Yet all of
the actors, except the shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims on the income
stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased security) from the undertaking of a new project. The
shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs. They therefore have
the right incentives to exercise discretion.” See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel “Voting in
Corporate Law”, 26 Journal of Law and Economics 395, 403 (1983).
21
See Michael C. Jensen “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function”, 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8, 19 (2001) (“In sum, the appropriate measure for the
organization is value creation, the change in the market value of all claims on the firm.”)
22
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel “Voting in Corporate Law”, 26 Journal of Law and
Economics 395, 402 (1983).
23
See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, Del. Ch. (2006)
24
See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174-5 Del. Ch. (2006)
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The explicit nexus of contracts paradigm has generated a standard way of
approaching control allocation in distressed firms. Following the works of Jensen and
Meckling 25 and Myers 26 allocation of control is associated exclusively to conflict of
interests between classes of individuals holding claims with different priority levels.
Jensen and Meckling’s observed that if shareholders of an over-leveraged firm (i.e. debt
over asset ratio over 1) are at the helm, they will have incentives to over-invest in high
variance projects leaving them to enjoy potential benefits and the creditors to suffer
potential losses. Myers’ uncovered the underinvestment problem. He described a firm’s
investment opportunity as call options whose likelihood of being exercised depends on
the conflict of interests between debtholders and shareholders. As debtholders had a cap
on maximum recovery, if they were at the helm they would disregard opportunities that
made them suffer losses in bad scenarios without letting them enjoy the benefits in the
good scenarios, regardless of the net present value of the project. Therefore, debtholders’
control over investment policy may lead to underinvestment. Empirical studies linking
firm characteristics to financial policy decisions suggest the accuracy of those theories. 27
Aghion and Bolton extended this line of work to show that ex ante efficiency is advanced
by allocating control contingent in the financial signals of the firm. 28
Relying on theoretical implications of the explicit nexus of contracts theory, Baird
and Rasmussen, as well as Skeel, have praised what they perceive as a new bankruptcy
era where control shifts to creditors upon distress. 29 Baird and Rasmussen consider that
25

See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure”, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976)
26
See Stewart C. Myers “Determinants of Corporate Borrowings”, 5 Journal of Financial Economics 147
(1977).
27
See, generally, Clifford W. Smith & Ross L. Watts “The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate
Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies”, 32 Journal of Financial Economics 263 (1992).
28
See Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting”,
59 Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992).
29
See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate
Governance”, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209 (2006); David A. Skeel, Jr. “The Past, Present and Future of Debtorin-Possession Financing”, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1905, 1920-1 (2004). The idea of control transfers due to
debt covenant violations is widely accepted in the finance literature. See, for example, Sudheer Chava &
Michael R. Roberts “How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants”, forthcoming
Journal of Finance, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=854324 (last visited
2/1/08), at 1 (“Upon breaching a covenant, control rights shift to the creditor who can use the threat of
accelerating the loan to choose their most preferred course of action or to extract concessions from the
borrower to choose the borrower's most preferred course of action”)

7

“Today’s investors allocate control rights among themselves through elaborate and
sophisticated contracts that already anticipate financial distress. In the presence of these
contracts, a law of corporate reorganizations is largely unnecessary.” 30 Professor Skeel
believes that the new “governance levers have dramatically improved the quality of
chapter 11 governance.” 31
Regardless of the appeal of its straightforward logic, 32 several papers have
discussed some shortcomings of the explicit nexus of contracts theory. Fama and Miller
have pointed out that bondholders are not completely protected from shareholder decision
making. 33 Becker points to worker’s specialization to observe that those employees can
be affected if the firm fires them before they recoup the investment in specialization and
therefore are residual claimants also. 34 In addition, Shleifer and Summers studied
efficiency gains of takeovers to conclude that at least in part they arise out of wealth
redistribution from stakeholders to shareholders (the redistribution of wealth may come
from employees, government or suppliers).35 Therefore, even though shareholders are the

30

See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “The End of Bankruptcy”, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 755
(2002). In the same vein they mention “When control rights are allocated coherently, no legal intervention
is needed to ensure that decisions about the firm’s future are made sensibly. Most large firms now allocate
control rights among investors in a way that ensures coherent decisionmaking throughout the firm’s life
cycle.” See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “The End of Bankruptcy”, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 778
(2002).
31
See David A. Skeel, Jr. “Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11”, 152 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 917, 920 (2003)
32
In this regard, Jensen notes that “It is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension at the
same time unless the dimensions are what are known as “monotonic transformations” of one another. Thus,
telling a manager to maximize current profits, market share, future growth in profits, and anything else one
pleases will leave that manager with no way to make a reasoned decision. In effect, it leaves the manager
with no objective.” See Michael C. Jensen “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function”, 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8, 10-1 (2001)
33
See Eugene Fama & Merton H. Miller, The Theory of Finance, Dryden Press, Hinsdale, Ill. (1972)
34
See Margaret M. Blair “Firm-Specific human Capital and Theories of the Firm”, in Employees and
Corporate Governance, Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe, eds., Brookings Institution Press (1999), at 603, citing Gary S. Becker Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to
Education, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York (1964).
35
See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers. “Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers”, in Corporate
Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, Alan J. Auerbach ed., The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
(1988), at 33-56. They contended that firms usually rely on implicit contracts which the company must be
trusted to respect. To the extent that long term contracts reduce costs, such trustworthiness is a valuable
asset to the firm. The need for long term contracts derives from the equal need to promote firm specific
investment. The problem is that even if ex ante efficient, in certain states of the world it will be ex post
efficient to breach those contracts. Hence, ex post cost breaching needs to be measured against ex ante
increase in cost (plus it is more likely to be, at least in part, a redistribution of wealth than anything else).
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only de jure residual claimants in the nexus of contracts, it doesn’t mean that they are the
only de facto residual claimants. 36
Other theories, such as the explicit and implicit nexus of contracts, 37 the property
rights theory of the firm 38 and the nexus specific investment, 39 have been proposed to
overcome the problems of the explicit nexus of contracts theory. 40 Despite important
differences, all these theories share an important feature: the allocation of residual
decision rights via ownership can have an effect on investments in relationship specific
capital (one which has lesser or no value outside the relation for which is created),
because it determines to some extent ex post distribution of surplus and therefore will
determine the parties’ willingness to invest ex ante. For example, Hart mentions the case
of GM ownership of Fisher Body, electricity generating plants owning coal mines, and
aluminum refineries owning bauxite mines as cases where allocating ownership generates
lesser possibilities of a hold-up and thereby more efficient ex ante investment. 41
These theories of the firm present a more complex structure than the explicit
nexus of contracts paradigm, 42 recognizing the existence of value outside mere
transaction costs and focusing on the existence of efficient complementarities. Implicit
contracts and the interaction of specific investments are difficult to understand and value,

36

Milgrom and Roberts suggest that “it may be impossible to identify any individual or group that is the
unique residual claimant or, indeed, to identify the benefits and costs accruing to any decision and so
compute the residuals.” See Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION &
MANAGEMENT, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1992), at 315.
37
See George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the
Firm”, 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 39 (2002).
38
See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical
and Lateral Integration”, 94 Journal of Political Economy 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore “Property
Rights and the nature of the Firm”, 98 Journal of Political Economy 1119 (1990).
39
See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales “Power in a Theory of the Firm”, 113 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 387 (1998); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales “The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A
Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms”, 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 805 (2001).
40
For an enlightening discussion of different theories of the firm, see Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam
“Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge Based Theory of the
Firm”, 101 Northwestern L. Rev. 1123 (2007).
41
See Oliver Hart “Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure”, Oxford University Press, New York (1995),
p. 29- 33, 50-1. For another clear example, see Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein “Corporate Finance,
the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations”, 12 Journal of Economic Perspectives 95, 98-9 (1998).
42
See George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the
Firm”, 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 39, 70-1 (2002).
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but their existence implies that there are hidden assets in an organization. 43 As a
consequence, the mere aggregation of financial claims may not accurately represent the
value of the firm. Further, focusing merely on financial claims to decide what to do with
the assets of a distressed firm may be suboptimal because it may disrupt an appropriate
asset allocation and control structure. 44 End game situations like bankruptcy maximize
the importance of control allocation, as the ability of the economic system to penalize
inefficient actions is considerably diminished.
The preceding discussion suggests that control allocation under different theories
of the firm may not be innocuous towards incentives beyond mere balancing of agency
costs of different set of claimants. The next section will look at control allocation costs
abandoning the explicit nexus of contracts paradigm and will show the existence of other
costs that need to be taken into account before advancing a definite judgment on the
desirability of lender control.

III. Single class of claimants and lender control costs
A. A Simple Model
In this section, I intend to specifically tie the notions of lender control and the
theory of the firm in bankruptcy. I present a stylized model drawing from previous work
by Hart, 45 to illustrate ineffiencies that may arise in reorganization under lender control.
The focus of this section is different from previous work on the matter because it focuses
on lender control costs where there is only one class of legal claimants. The existence of
more than one class of legal claimants has been shown to be the source of inefficiencies
in bankruptcy. 46 Hence, I will show that assignment of property rights in reorganization

43

See Luigi Zingales “In search for New Foundations”, 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1635 (2000).
See George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the
Firm”, 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 39, 41 (2002).
45
See Oliver D. Hart “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm”, 4 Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization 119, 125-7 (1988).
46
The problem is closely related to what Hansmann and Kraakman call “liquidation protection” when
discussing affirmative asset partitioning. See Henry Hasmann & Reinier Kraakman “The Essential Role of
Organizational Law”, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 403 (2000) (“That threat lies principally in the possibility that
partial or complete liquidation of the firm's assets could destroy some or all of the firm's going concern
value, with the result that, even if the firm were to remain solvent after a partial liquidation, the net value
left to the firm's owners, and available as security for the firm's creditors, might well be reduced”).
44
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is not irrelevant, under certain conditions, to the value of a firm and that its effects have
been overlooked by authors defending the idea of lender control of reorganizations.
This section, hence, illustrates a stylized version of chapter 11 case where, as
Baird and Rasmussen and Skeel have discussed, a lender is in control of the bankrupt
debtor 47 and, as a result, in control of the proceedings also. 48 Unlike general chapter 11
proceedings, I assume that there is only one class of legal claimants, the lender in control
(LC) who owns all the debt claims to the firm, and another party, an independent service
provider (SP), who has the ability to make relationship specific investments. The
existence of only one source of legal claimants could be interpreted as a situation where a
firm is so heavily indebted that there is not any plausible scenario under which the lender
could be fully paid. Alternatively, it could be understood as a situation where one person
provided all the financing to the firm, as a result being the only equity and debt holder for
a business which due to a potent financial shock is currently worth a lot less than the face
value of debt. 49 It is important to note that SP is not an employee of the debtor and
therefore will not generate a claim to salary under the model. This feature of the model is
not essential, but serves the purpose of highlighting the existence of control related costs
where there’s only one class of legal claimants. 50
At the outset of the model, I am denying the possibility that controlling lenders
can make any relationship specific investments. Although I acknowledge that this is an
extreme assumption, there are reasons to believe that it is closely related to lending
practices. At least in the US, lenders focus seems to be on assessing the viability of

47

See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “The End of Bankruptcy”, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002);
David A. Skeel, Jr. “Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11”, 152 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 917 (2003).
48
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang “Bargaining and the division of value in Corporate
Reorganization”, 8 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 253 (1992)
49
Notice that this interpretation doesn’t necessarily mean that the business was originally undercapitalized.
It is conceivable that a financially healthy business from the onset may become bankrupt after losses and/or
a financial shock.
50
In fact, very little would change if SP was an employee with a fixed salary. This presentation is
admittedly extreme, in the sense that no part of the relationship between LC and SP is subject to an explicit
contract at date 1.
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possible investments and in monitoring those investments. 51 This specialization in
monitoring is documented by lenders’ extensive experience on the matter. 52 At the same
time, lenders’ lack of specific knowledge about other type of business’ aspects (i.e. day to
day running of the firm) is demonstrated by Mann who obtained extensive anecdotal
information showing that lenders prefer to leave assets with debtors under the expectation
of higher recovery rates. 53
The debtor firm has only one asset producing a profit with certainty (alternatively,
all the assets of the firm can be thought as a unity where the ability to work with them is
either given or not). This bankruptcy reorganization model has two periods, 1 and 2. In
period 1, SP chooses an action e representing relationship specific investment which
generates a total return at date 2 equal to the value of the firm V(e). SP’s action cannot be
observed by any other person and makes him incur a private cost equal to e.54 In the case
that SP does not invest (e=0) then at period 2 firm value is V(0).55 The previous depiction
of the reorganization time frame is entirely plausible given the reported length of US
chapter 11 proceedings. For example, Carapeto found the length of the proceedings for
firms reorganizing after the proposal of the first plan to be on average 272 days, while for
firms where more than one plan was proposed the average length was 524 days. 56 To

51

See Dianna Preece & Donald J. Mullineaux “Monitoring, Loan Renegotiability, and Firm Value: The
Role of Lending Synicates”, 20 Journal of Banking & Finance 577, 578 (1996) (“The prevalent
interpretation in the literature is that financial intermediaries provide specialized monitoring, screening, and
certification services to borrowers”). See also Douglas W. Diamond “Monitoring and Reputation: The
Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt”, 99 Journal of Political Economy 689 (1991)
52
Roberts and Sufi who show that more than one quarter of publicly listed firms in the US between 1996
and 2005 violate a financial covenant at least once. See Michael R. Roberts & Amar Sufi “Control Rights
and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation”, working paper available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962131 (last visited 1/29/08)
53
See Ronald J. Mann “Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt”, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 159, 178
(1997) (“When questioned about their reticence to repossess collateral, the account executives uniformly
pointed to the general success of allowing the debtor to sell the collateral: the executives ordinarily expect
to get full repayment if they leave collateral in the debtor's possession and rarely expect to get full
repayment if they do not. Surprisingly, that perception seems to be well justified.”)
54
It is assumed that SP does not have any financial constraints which would force him to invest a level of e
inferior to his first best option.
55
When e=0, LC and SP do not enter into an agreement in date 2 and LC obtains the 100% of V(0).
56
See Maria Carapeto “Is Bargaining in Chapter 11 Costly?”, Cass Business School Working Paper,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=241569 (2003). This figure is consistent
with the findings in other studies. See, for example, Keneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison “Creditor
Control and Conflict in Chapter 11”, working paper available at
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keep things as simple as possible, it is assumed that V(e) is deterministic, twice
differentiable and strictly concave. 57
Following Grossman and Hart, 58 there is an action involving the asset which can
be taken at date 2 but cannot be specified in the contract at date 1. This generates
contractual incompleteness, in turn making residual control rights relevant as whoever is
in control will be able to obtain a share of any possible benefits arising out of a
consensual transaction. To show this contractual incompleteness, it is assumed that
whoever is in control always obtains a non-verifiable fraction (1-α) of V(e), where
0<α<1. This (1-α) fraction of firm value may be interpreted as if the controlling lender
presents a reorganization plan where the value of the firm is underscored, so that he can
obtain a larger portion of resulting business’ equity. Indeed, (1-α) speaks about one of the
most significant problems in bankruptcy, determining firm value, one that the United
States reorganization scheme was designed to sidestep. 59
The remaining share αV(e) is verifiable, and therefore contractible upon in the
second period. As a result, a contract between LC and SP can only consist of a division of
the firm’s verifiable return or profits, π=αV(e). As only π is verifiable, SP’s reward upon
trading depends on it and is represented by a fraction βπ, where 0<β≤1 is the rule the
parties adopted on the division of any profits arising out of a transaction in period 2.
In order to maximize social efficiency and regardless of who is in control, the
investment should work to maximize V(e)-e. As LC controls the firm, SP settles at date 1
for a level of e knowing that LC will obtain at least the fraction of value (1-α)V(e) and
maybe more depending on LC’s bargaining power. Therefore, SP works to maximize his
http://www.law.duke.edu/conference/triangle/morrison_chapter11.pdf (last visited 5/02/07) (reporting that
firms stay in bankruptcy an average of 15 months)
57
Ergo, V’(e)>0 and V”(e)<0.
58
See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical
and Lateral Integration”, 94 Journal of Political Economy 691, 696 (1986) (“We have in mind a situation in
which it is prohibitively difficult to think about and describe unambiguously in advance how all the
potentially relevant aspects of the production allocation should be chosen as a function of the many states
of the world”).
59
One of the principal innovations of the Bankruptcy Code was to use voting in Chapter 11 in order to
avoid the need for the court to perform cumbersome valuations.
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private benefit βαV(e)-e. It follows that because β≤1 (which is the case as (1-α)V(e) is
not contractible) SP will not capture the full value deriving from his effort. Contrasting
this case to the one where SP controls the firm 60 and invests in order to maximize both
the verifiable and non-verifiable part
(1-α)V(e)+αV(e)-e
confirms the intuition that in the former scenario SP’s investment decision will not be
socially optimal. 61 Only when SP controls the firm’s asset the investment level allows
achieving the first-best.
This simple model shows that, under conditions of contractual incompleteness
(which allow value divertion) and relationship specific investments, the value of a firm
may heavily depend on control allocation. In fact, Hart states that giving the party
capable of making a value enhancing relationship specific investment “entitlement to the
asset's profit stream will not be enough since an outside owner may be able to divert
some of the asset's return for his own uses, thus dulling the manager's incentives.” 62 In
the same spirit, Blair and Stout state, while discussing the importance of legal personality
of corporations, that “Specific investment is discouraged when individual investors have
a legal right to prematurely withdraw their contributions (and with it, the ability to
opportunistically threaten to withdraw in order to “hold up” their fellow investors in an
attempt to extract a larger share of the surplus generated by corporate activity).” 63

B. Relaxing the restriction on the number of claimholders
Allowing for the introduction of more than one class of claimholders, or even just
more than one claimholder in the same class, does not provide a rosier picture. In fact,
when LC is not the only claimholder (i.e. where there is a class of equityholders and/or
junior creditors), which is usually the case in corporate reorganization proceedings, his
claim will have a cap (C). This cap limits the ability of LC of reaping benefits from
60

Ergo, SP doesn’t need to share with LC (1-β)αV(e) either
This follows from the assumption that V(e) is twice differentiable and strictly concave which means that
V(e) will have a larger value than αV(e) for any value of e.
62
See Oliver D. Hart “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm”, 4 Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization 119, 127 (1988).
63
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout “Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law”,
31 Iowa J. Corp. L. 719, 730 (2006)
61
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reorganization in two ways: it makes C the maximum LC can obtain from (1-β)αV(e); in
addition the maximum LC will be able to divert to himself from underscoring the value
of reorganization is also capped. The cap on the divertion amount is also derived from C,
and follows from
[(1 - α )V( e )] ∗
because

C
(1 - β )αV( e )

C
is the maximum percentage of stock assignable to LC under a
(1 - β )αV( e )

reorganization plan. The relative importance of the cap on a controlling lender is
apparent. For corporate bankruptcies in the second part of 2001, Ayotte and Morrison
report that ratio of secured debt to assets in the filing schedules was 0.65. This figure
likely represents a higher bound on the ratio as there is a significant drop in the value of
the assets reported in the last 10-K relative to the figure reported in the bankruptcy
schedules. 64
Unfortunately, these effects are not beneficial to SP or more generally any party
making relationship specific investments (unless the intersection of the set of relationship
specific investors and the set of other claimholders is non empty). Further, they may be
prejudicial as it makes any liquidation strategy (usually generating smaller returns) more
attractive to LC as his benefits from reorganization are reduced. In turn, making the
liquidation strategy more appealing to LC boosts his bargaining position, which generally
means that β is smaller and negatively affects SP’s ex ante investment.
The analysis above did not take into account an additional factor which is at the
heart of lender control: security interests. 65 As long as LC is over-secured his ability to
gain from any growth in V(e) in good states of the world, as mentioned earlier, is partly
reaped by other claimholders. The other claimholders, though, do not share in the same
64

The mean value of assets reported in the last 10-K in their sample was 122.81 millions, while the median
value of the assets reported in the bankruptcy schedules was 37.34 millions.
65
Ayotte and Morrison have recently conducted an empirical investigation of this issue, finding that when
secured creditors are oversecured reorganization cases are significantly shorter and more likely to result in
a sale. See Keneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison “Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11”,
working paper available at http://www.law.duke.edu/conference/triangle/morrison_chapter11.pdf (last
visited 5/02/07).
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way with the losses that may occur in the bad states of the world. Hence, LC’s
assessment of the growth in V will be biased again making the liquidation option more
viable, further reducing β and affecting the ex ante investment in e.

C. Inefficient restrictions to business plans
Start-up firms financed by venture capital firms (VC) have been related to
distressed firms, because in both cases the investors have to deal with robust conflict of
interests. 66 According to Kaplan, Sensoy and Stromberg it is possible and likely that VC
firms place implicit constraints in business plan modifications 67 because they invested
their money in a certain business plan. 68 This situation is in sharp contrast from the
evidence on adaptation obtained by Bhide on other start-ups lacking VC funding. 69 Bhide
discusses many entrepreneurs who started successful businesses without a detailed
business plan at all and little funds. In the case of these entrepreneurs, the success of their
ventures depends heavily on opportunistic adaptation, rather than merely following ex
ante ideas. As a result, it appears that VC firms in their attempt to limit conflict of
interests also restrict the set of growth opportunities.
Most likely, the same scenario appears with a lender in control. Conditional on
the conjecture of similarity between distressed and start-ups’ firms, controlling lenders of
distressed firms will tend to constrain more business plan changes or adaptations limiting
the ability of distressed firms to gain on unexpected opportunities. The fundamental
reason behind the adaptation ability difference is the relatively poorer ability of a
controlling lender to attribute unexpected events to the right causes due in large part to

66

See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg “Financial Contracting Meets the Real World: An Empirical
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts”, 70 Review of Financial Studies 281, (2003).
67
See Steven N. Kaplan, Berk A. Sensoy & Per Stromberg “What Are Firms? Evolution from Birth to
Public Companies”, working paper available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11581.pdf (last visited
1/29/2008), at 30.
68
Referring to corporations (as banks or lenders in general) preference towards investments, Bhide states
“The nature og the evidence required by corporate decision-makers leads them to favor initiatives where
the risks and returns can be objectively assessed.” See Amar V. Bhide, The Origin and Evolution of New
Business, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2000), at 120
69
See Amar V. Bhide, The Origin and Evolution of New Business, Oxford University Press, New York,
NY (2000), at 53-68.
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the lack of expertise in the particular venture.70 It should be noted that this investment
scope restriction is separate and complementary to an investment magnitude restriction
imposed by lenders when firms’ performance is poor. 71
Ambiguity appears to play a role in a controlling lender decision-making process
also. 72 According to Camerer, ambiguity is “known to be missing information”. 73 Several
experiments, following Ellsberg’s famous paradox,74 have shown that people are prone to
have aversion towards ambiguity. 75 Interestingly, a person’s attitude towards ambiguity
is unrelated to her attitude towards risk. 76 Therefore, the fact that a lender has extensive
expertise on decisionmaking in general (i.e. takes risks neutral decisions) does not
immediately translate into adequate decisions when there is ambiguity involved.
Expertise has been identified as an offsetting factor for ambiguity aversion. 77 Despite
their ability to analyze investments, 78 it is unlikely that controlling lenders will be willing
to invest on gaining the necessary experience to offset the ambiguity aversion in a
particular firm, as it is not their forte.
The investment scope restriction and ambiguity aversion arguments would further
suggest that lenders are suboptimal controlling parties not just due to Myers’
70

Bhide considers that the capacity for adaptation depends on the entrepreneurs decisiveness, openmindedness, managing internal conflict and attribution skills. See Amar V. Bhide, The Origin and
Evolution of New Business, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2000), at 99-104.
71
See Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi “Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy”,
working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928688, p. 3 (last checked
11/23/07) (“whether a loan includes an investment restriction is often more sensitive to changes in firm
performance than amendments to interest rates and collateral requirements”). See also, Amar Sufi “Banks
Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis”, working paper available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=723361 (last visited 1/30/08), at 25 (“Even controlling
for the financial factors leading to covenant violations, a covenant violation has an independently large and
statistically significant effect on the availability of lines of credit”)
72
It is unclear whether ambiguity aversion causes the restriction on business’ plan adaptations, are both
generated by a different phenomenon or are completely independent.
73
See Colin F. Camerer “Individual Decision Making”, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics,
John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J 1995, at 645.
74
See Daniel Ellsberg “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms” 75 Quarterly Journal of Economics 643
(1961)
75
See Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky ‘‘Who Accepts Savage’s Axioms?’’ 19 Behavioral Science 368 (1974)
76
See Colin F. Camerer “Individual Decision Making”, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics,
John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J 1995, at 646
77
See Amar V. Bhide, The Origin and Evolution of New Business, Oxford University Press, New York,
NY (2000), at 97
78
See section III.A supra
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underinvestment argument or a preference towards low volatility projects, but also due to
credibility problems for project alterations: a project modification would require the
lender to incur additional investigation costs to assess its profitability while his
investment upside would remain the same. Hence, the lender would tend to disfavor
investing new money and would favor a sale of the business. Intimately related, if a
controlling lender limits the investment opportunity set, it may foster an expectation of
failure which in itself could trigger actual failure.79

D. Summary
I have shown that broadening the view of the theory of the firm permits to see that
lender control poses costs non-investigated before. In addition, the above discussion
shows that lender control social costs are boosted by the costs of lender control
discovered under the nexus of explicit contracts. Finally, I exposed the fact that lender
control may also constrain the investment opportunity set in order to exclude sizable
business plan changes. Therefore, when considering control allocations in lengthy
processes as chapter 11, the above analysis suggest that having a controlling lender at the
helm may be as bad as having equityholders there. It follows that policymakers reflecting
on bankruptcy reform should try to move beyond either possibility. The following section
uses these intuitions to argue that lender control liability should serve to penalize selfserving behavior which runs counter to the optimal use of the assets.

IV. Lender control liability and functionally related theories
As the previous section has shown, DIP lender control may generate ex ante
inefficient investment even in the absence of conflict of interests between legal
claimholders. This section argues that the theory of the firm is further useful in providing
a rationale for lender control liability and functionally related theories whose role has
been dwarfed under current interpretations. 80 In fact, I argue that once the explicit nexus

79

For a similar point made on start-ups, see Amar V. Bhide, The Origin and Evolution of New Business,
Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2000), at 72.
80
See William H. Lawrence “Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications
to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing”, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1387, 1389 (1989)
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of contracts theory is abandoned lender control liability theories’ can regain their proper
role as deterrent of socially inefficient behavior.

A. A System with no Bite
Control inspired theories of lender liability have an important pedigree line in the
United States dating at least as far back as Baltimore & O. Tel. Co. of Baltimore County
et al. v. Interstate Tel. Co. 81 Nonetheless, and despite its increased sophistication, a long
line of precedents in this area does not translate into much clarity, at least beyond the
objective of preserving equality of distribution. 82 For example, since In The Matter of
Mobile Steel Co., in order to subordinate certain claims there is a clear test requiring a
combination of inequitable conduct and either unfair advantage or injury to other
creditors, 83 but what amounts to inequitable conduct remains vague. The same can be
said about the law of agency for those cases where there is no explicit consent by the
agent to be acting on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control. 84 Nor
have legal scholars’ work eradicated the uncertainty. 85 As a result, it is not farfetched to
think that lender control liability theories have been applied as a reaction to situations

81

See Baltimore & O. Tel. Co. of Baltimore County et al. v. Interstate Tel. Co., 54 Fed. 50 (4th Circuit,
1893)
82
This equality of distribution is no more than a default rule from contract and property law. See Henry
Hasmann & Reinier Kraakman “The Essential Role of Organizational Law”, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 407 (2000)
(“The default rules of property and contract law in effect provide that, absent contractual agreement to the
contrary, each of the entrepreneur's creditors has an equal-priority floating lien upon the entrepreneur's
entire pool of assets as a guarantee of performance.”)
83
See In The Matter of Mobile Steel Company, 563 F2d 692, 699-700 (3rd Circuit, 1977) (“… three
conditions must be satisfied before exercise of the power of equitable subordination is appropriate.
(i) The claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable conduct; (ii) The misconduct must have
resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; (iii)
Equitable subordination of the claim must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.”)
84
See “Restatement of the Law Third, Agency”, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, Minnesota
Vol. 1 p. 17 (2006). The Restatement defines agency as a “fiduciary relationship that arises when one
person (a “principal”) manifests assent to another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise
consents so to act”
85
For example, Professor Lawrence has considered that “Lender control is neither illegal nor inherently
bad. Control, however, is easily subjected to a variety of excesses and abuses, so legal responses are
justified to keep such behavior in check.” See William H. Lawrence “Lender Control Liability: An
Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing”, 62 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1387, 1390 (1989). It is not clear what exactly constitutes abuse but, as a result of the abuse backed
reasoning, some scholars call for the substitution of lender liability by fiduciary duty principles. See
William H. Lawrence “Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the
Relational Theory of Secured Financing”, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1387, 1423-30 (1989).
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strongly suggesting a “sense of wrongdoing” from an equality standpoint, rather than the
implementation of a systematic approach.
A more in depth look into prominent lender control liability cases deriving from
the law of agency and equitable subordination seems to reaffirm this theory. A milestone
case from the law of agency is A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc. 86 In Jenson
Farms, Cargill, the creditor, financed Warren’s, the debtor, grain elevator operation and
purchased the majority of the its grain. Cargill also made constant recommendations to
Warren, as it believed that the debtor needed strong paternal guidance. After Warren
ceased operations, other creditors sued Cargill under the theory that Cargill became liable
as a principal of Warren on contracts made by the debtor with the farmers. Minnesota’s
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment finding that an agency relationship was established
because Cargill became a principal when it assumed de facto control over the conduct of
his debtor as an active participant in the debtor's operations, made key economic
decisions and decided whether to keep the debtor in existence. The court stated “By
directing Warren to implement its recommendations, Cargill manifested its consent that
Warren would be its agent. Warren acted on Cargill's behalf in procuring grain for Cargill
as the part of its normal operations which were totally financed by Cargill. Further, an
agency relationship was established by Cargill's interference with the internal affairs of
Warren, which constituted de facto control of the elevator.” 87
Despite being frequently cited as a way to explain lender control liability, Jenson
Farms doesn’t provide a clear understanding of why it is desirable to subject a controlling
creditor to liability (when limited liability is readily available for equity holders) nor what
should the extent of that liability be. 88 The same could be said of equitable subordination

86

See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minnesota Supreme Court, 1981).
Another important case involving agency law is Buck v Nash-Finch Company, 78 S.D. 334; 102 N.W.2d 84
(Supreme Court of South Dakota, 1960).
87
See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minnesota Supreme Court, 1981).
88
There is, nonetheless, a limit on the amount of the awards, as lender control liability theories generally
have a retributional character (unless a statute determine otherwise). See “Restatement of the Law Third,
Agency”, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, Minnesota Vol. 2 p. 115-23 (2006).
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cases. In the famous Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 89 the court found that
Standard Gas & Electric had operative control of Deep Rock, the debtor. A majority of
Deep Rock's officers were officers or directors of Standard or Standard’s parent
corporation. The officers of Deep Rock reported to and were always subject to the
direction of officers and directors of Standard. In addition, the fiscal affairs “were wholly
controlled by Standard, which was its banker and its only source of financial aid.” 90
When Standard tried to obtain a controlling position in the reorganized firm, the Supreme
Court ordered that “No plan ought to be approved which does not accord the preferred
stockholders a right of participation in the equity in the Company's assets prior to that of
Standard” 91 because Deep Rock was bankrupt as a result of “the abuses in management
due to the paramount interest of interlocking officers and directors in the preservation of
Standard's position, as at once proprietor and creditor of Deep Rock.” 92 Once again, the
questions regarding the reason behind the desirability of lender control liability and the
extent of that liability remain largely unanswered.
Perhaps as a reaction against this lack of clarity, there has been a steady stream of
cases objecting to the existence of lender control liability. The trend can be seen in cases
such as In The Matter of Mobile Steel Company, 93 In re Ludwig Honold Manufacturing
Company, Inc., 94 Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of Whiting, 95 In the
Matter of Clark Pipe and Supply Co., Inc. v Associates Commercial Corporation, 96
Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric Capital
Corporation, 97 Schwan's Sales Enters. v Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 98 Mike Smith v
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See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). Another landmark case involving
equitable subordination is Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939)
90
See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 311 (1939)
91
See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 324 (1939)
92
See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323 (1939)
93
See In The Matter of Mobile Steel Company, 563 F2d 692 (3rd Circuit, 1977)
94
See In re Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Company, Inc., 46 B.R. 125 (Bkrtcy.D.Ea.Penn., 1985)
95
See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th circuit, 1990)
96
See In the Matter of Clark Pipe and Supply Co., Inc. v. Associates Commercial Corporation, 893 F.2d
693 (5th Circuit, 1990)
97
See Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric Capital Corporation, 247
F.3d 471 (3rd Circuit, 2001)
98
See Schwan's Sales Enters. v. Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 189 (U.S. District Court of
Massachusetts, 2005)
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Ajax Magnathermic Corp., et. al, 99 and Henry v Lehman Commercial Paper, 100 all of
which appear to limit the extent to which remedies on controlling lenders can be
applied. 101 In this counter-wave, the first line of defense against findings of liability
comes from a safe harbor obtained from agency law theory. As a way of distinguishing
what controlling parties may do without becoming principals, the Restatement suggests
that the difference between mere influence and control depends on the consent given by
the agent to the exercise of that dominance. 102 Therefore, the formality of an agreement
between parties on the way forward prevents the lender from being deemed in active
control of the debtor. For example, in Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology
Corporation; General Electric Capital Corporation, Chief Judge Becker considered that
“…we must be scrupulous in our efforts to distinguish between situations in which a
parent/lender has ultimately assumed responsibility for the continuing viability of a
company… and situations in which the borrower has retained the ultimate responsibility
for keeping the company active.” 103
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See Mike Smith v. Ajax Magnathermic Corp., et. al, 144 Fed. Appx. 482 (6th Circuit, 2005)
See Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, 471 F3d 977 (9th Circuit, 2006)
101
A notable exception comes from Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial Corporation, 828 F.2d 686
(11th Circuit, 1987), where the court reversed a summary judgment which considered that Citibank (the
lender) was not a principal of Data Lease (the debtor) (“In determining whether an agency relationship
exists between Citibank and the third party defendants, the key issue is control and domination… In his
deposition, Joseph Stefan made the following admission: Q. Did you work for Citibank? A. At the bottom
of everything the answer would be yes. They put me there and they took me out. Stefan further testified that
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Finally, Stefan described his displeasure with Miami National's head of operations and his inability to
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bear.” See “Restatement of the Law Third, Agency”, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul,
Minnesota Vol. 1 p. 28 (2006). A similar test can be found for example in Chemtool, Inc. v. Lubricant
Technologies Inc. noting that “the test to determine whether a principal-agent relationship exists is whether
the alleged principal has the right to control the agent, and whether the alleged agent can affect the legal
relationships of the principal.” See Chemtool, Inc. v. Lubricant Technologies Inc., 148 F.3d 742 (7th Circuit,
1998). This consensual characteristic sets apart the agency definition of control from the definitions of
power in the social sciences. For example, Professor Dowding classifies power in outcome power, “the
ability of an actor to bring about or help to bring about outcomes” and social power, “the ability of an actor
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Keith Dowding “Power”, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN (1996), at 5.
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As a second part of the strategy, courts combine the previous reasoning with
equitable subordination special considerations in cases where the party who allegedly
acted in an inequitable manner was not an insider. For example, in In re Ludwig Honold
Manufacturing Company, Inc., the court held that “a creditor who is not an insider is
under no fiduciary obligation to its debtor or to other creditors of the debtor in the
collection of its claim.” 104 In Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, the court expressed
that “Where non-insider, non-fiduciary claims are involved, as is the case here, the level
of pleading and proof is elevated: gross and egregious conduct will be required before a
court will equitably subordinate a claim.” 105
This counter-wave of cases is heavily defended from a contractual freedom point
of view. For example, in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of Whiting Judge
Easterbrook mentioned that “…we are not willing to embrace a rule that requires
participants in commercial transactions not only to keep their contracts but also do ‘more’
- just how much more resting in the discretion of a bankruptcy judge assessing the
situation years later… Courts may not convert one form of contract into the other after
the fact, without raising the cost of credit or jeopardizing its availability. Unless pacts are
enforced according to their terms, the institution of contract, with all the advantages
private negotiation and agreement brings, is jeopardized.” 106 This reasoning has been
embraced by courts in similar situations, as it can be seen in Trenwick America Litigation
Trust v. Ernst & Young. 107 In Trenwick, while discussing a claim for deepening
insolvency and the existence of creditor protection under Delaware Law, the Delaware
Chancery Court stated “And Delaware public policy is strongly supportive of freedom of
contract, thereby supporting the primary means by which creditors protect themselves through the negotiations of toothy contractual provisions securing their right to seize on
the assets of the borrowing subsidiary.” 108 Therefore, in order to limit the negative extent
104
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See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 173 (Del. Ch., 2006). In
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of their rulings on the credit market, courts consistently decide that a creditor exercising
his contractual rights can not be subject to wrongdoing.
It appears, then, that the objective of equality of distribution which has been put
forward so far as the rationale behind lender control liability theories may not be actually
accomplished, as these theories have little, if any, impact on creditors’ behavior. The
impact on lender behavior must indeed be relatively trivial when the trend signaling the
absence of lender control liability is combined by a recent steady stream of legal
academics claiming that creditors are calling the shots in reorganization proceedings. 109
A similar type of claim can regularly be found in the financial literature. 110 Although
many situations are likely engineered to prevent any sort of control taking by the

while recognizing that the firm's creditors have become its residual claimants and the advancement of their
best interests has become the firm's principal objective.” See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst &
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lender, 111 it can not be the case that this is what happens in every case unless all the
previous authors are wrong. 112 Therefore, lending practices and case law seem to be
talking to each other in different tongues.

B. Beyond the Explicit Nexus of Contracts Paradigm
In this subsection, I argue that, at least in part, the previously described “control
disconnect” derives from an understanding of the theory of the firm similar to the explicit
nexus of contracts theory. As it was noted in section II, the explicit nexus of contracts
theory looks at firms as mere ways of connecting contracts which fully pay everyone but
the shareholders their opportunity costs. 113 This has been the traditional way of looking at
lender liability, as can be seen in Fischel’s analysis.114 Accordingly, this theory deeply
believes in the freedom of contracts as a wealth creating mechanism. The string of
thought is as follows: if freedom of contracts is limited, then the possible set of contract
permutations and combinations that may generate a firm gets reduced. As a result, there
exists the possibility that value enhancing combinations are left out and social efficiency
111

There is evidence of this legal engineering. See Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan “Bankers on
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is not achieved. Following this logic, it comes to no surprise to encounter claims like the
ones found in the Kham Shoes or Trenwick opinions cited above. 115
The above description of freedom of contracts when combined with the explicit
nexus of contracts paradigm and agency law’s negative control safe harbor is misleading.
The problem arises because the combination of those theories’ assumptions determines
what the causes for unfairness and damages can be. 116 If two parties enter into a contract
without incurring in any sort of fraudulent or misrepresenting behavior, then because they
have acted within their scope of freedom and by assumption other parties are paid their
full opportunity cost for their services, the parties’ conduct cannot be considered unfair
nor produce damages unless the contract is breached. 117 This reasoning can be seen in,
for example, Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 118 a case arising for responsibility for backpay
and benefits owed to employees when their employer closed without giving them sixty
days written notification, as required under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification (WARN) Act. 119 A class of employees moved to collect against
Westinghouse Credit Corporation, the main lender of the employer, under the theory that
through its financing it had become the principal. While denying the employees claim,
Judge Fagg stated Westinghouse Credit Corporation’s “use of legitimate financial
controls to protect its security interest does not make [Westinghouse Credit Corporation]
an employer under WARN.” 120
Interestingly, lender control liability theories interpreted under the umbrella of the
explicit nexus of contracts theory are reduced to exactly the same role as the absolute
115

For another example, see Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric
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priority rule 121 for those cases where the lender did not incur in any fraudulent or
misrepresenting behavior. The absolute priority rule codifies a judge-made rule providing
that any plan of reorganization in which claimholders of lower priority obtain payment
when claimholders of higher priority are not fully compensated is invalid. 122 And exactly
this is the scope of what can be achieved, at least for voluntary creditors, when lender
control liability theories are restricted by the explicit nexus of contracts theory and
agency law notions of negative control.
Only after we move away from the explicit nexus of contracts paradigm, can
lender control liability theories regain a proper role. Their role should be to penalize selfserving behavior that a controlling lender imposed on the firm when that behavior runs
counter to socially desirable behavior. In practical terms, lender control liability should
work in a similar way as compensatory liability work under general tort law theory:
lender control liability should impose a penalty ex post which would make the lender take
efficient actions ex ante. 123 Such an understanding would be consistent with the idea
championed by Professor Shavell that damages basically should operate to achieve only
optimal deterrence of injurers. 124
Although broadening the scope of lender control liability theories permits to
reposition them in such a way as to promote socially efficient decisionmaking by the
controlling lender, it should be noted that their effect over a party with the ability to make
relationship specific investments is limited. Lender control liability theories impose a
penalty on a lender whose strategy was self serving, but this doesn’t fully restore the
incentives of a service provider to invest in order to achieve the first best. There are cases
when even though the impact of lender control liability will cause the controlling lender
to ex post act in a socially efficient manner, the amount of relationship specific
121
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investments will be smaller than the social optimal. Nonetheless, it is not clear whether in
these later situations having a controlling lender would be worse or better than having the
debtor remain in control. 125 Therefore, imposing liability on a lender merely for gaining
control doesn’t seem appropriate.
It should be noted, nevertheless, that the prescribed role for lender control could
not be fully achieved if the agency law formalistic distinction between positive and
negative control is not dropped. This categorization seems to have little to do with reality
(as both legal and finance scholars regularly point to actual transfers of control achieved
only through negative control) 126 and may be generating worse problems (though masked
ones) than the ones it is intended to solve. Further, lender counsel claims such as “the dire
consequences [for their clients] of lender involvement in a borrower’s business” haven’t
been demonstrated in any way. 127 The following section analyses problems derived from
lender control strict liability and connected to the voiced fears of biased judgments
against lenders.

V. Hindsight Bias, Strict Liability and other Heuristics
So far, I have used the theory of the firm to show that lender control may generate
inefficiencies regarding legally not recognized claims, regardless of the existence of more
than one class of legal claimants. In addition, I have used the intuitions from the theory of
the firm to show a proper role for lender control liability theories. Lender control liability
may need to be constrained if adjudicating problems due to cognitive errors impedes
125
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achieving its purpose. Hindsight bias has been signaled as the reason behind those limits.
This section will analyze damage assessments to show that control based theories need to
cope not just with hindsight bias but also with anchoring.

A. Hindsight Bias and Anchoring
A common argument against lender control liability comes from the perils of
unevenly heard cases by both juries and judges. This fear is associated to the inability of
adjudicators, juries and judges, to correctly understand business decisionmaking (i.e. due
to their lack of expertise on the matter) and the likelihood that they will incur in
systematic errors due to cognitive biases. 128 The former criticism is largely limited by the
specificity of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction. The later problem, hindsight bias, seems to
remain strong.
The risk of opinions tainted by hindsight bias, in connection with the strict
liability character of lender control liability theories, has generated sharp criticism. For
example, Hynes believes that it creates a dilemma for a controlling creditor: “The more
critical the financial condition of a business, the more control the creditor will want to
assert in an effort to keep the business in a state of solvency and thus able to repay its
debts. Yet the more control the creditor asserts, the greater risk it runs under the common
law of agency of incurring personal liability for the debts of the business”. 129 In addition,
supporters of limiting lenders liability also look into comparisons with the business
judgment rule (BJR). 130 If under BJR a manager is not liable unless there’s some sort of
128
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gross negligence, then imposing strict liability on a controlling lender would be strikingly
inconsistent.
Cognitive errors are mental shortcuts which “can create cognitive illusions that
produce erroneous judgments.” 131 Among those errors, hindsight bias occurs when
“[p]eople overstate their own ability to have predicted the past and believe that others
should have been able to predict events better than was possible.” 132 Psichologists
explain the hindsight bias as resulting “primarily from the natural (and useful) tendency
for the brain to incorporate known outcomes into existing knowledge automatically, and
to make further inferences from that knowledge.” 133 Kamin and Rachlinski report the
persistency of the effect despite numerous debiasing attempts. 134 It easily follows that
the hindsight bias defies the prowess of decisionmakers (blurring the distinction between
opportunism and an unfortunate turn of events) while it also questions the benefit of
broadening the scope of lender control liability due to the important possibility that nonnegligent controlling lenders would be found liable.
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(2005).
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Empirical studies have demonstrated that judges, including in particular
bankruptcy judges, are also affected by cognitive biases. 135 In addition, several opinions
recognize that adjudicators maybe under the influence of hindsight bias and therefore try
to avoid taking actions that would make them prone to cognitive errors. 136 For example,
in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of Whiting Judge Easterbrook mentioned
that “Debtor submits that conduct may be "unfair" and "inequitable" for [the] purpose [of
determining whether to apply equitable subordination] even though the creditor complies
with all contractual requirements, but we are not willing to embrace a rule that requires
participants in commercial transactions not only to keep their contracts but also do
"more" -just how much more resting in the discretion of a bankruptcy judge assessing the
situation years later.” 137 In Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.,
the Delaware Chancery Court expressed “What Delaware law does not do is to impose
retroactive fiduciary obligations on directors simply because their chosen business
strategy did not pan out.” 138
Another well-known cognitive error is referred to as anchoring. Tversky and
Kahneman define anchoring as the bias which occurs when people make estimates
depending on an irrelevant starting point. 139 Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich consider
that “[a]nchors affect judgment by changing the standard of reference that people use
when making numeric judgments.” 140 Anchoring derives from the difficult problem of
disregarding known information. 141 Wistrich, Guthrie and Rachlinski provide three
theories to help explain this phenomenom: motivation, ironic process theory and mental
135
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contamination. Motivation implies that people told to disregard information may increase
their desire to attend to it, a concept researchers refer to as “psychological reactance”.
Ironic process theory poses that even if individuals want to ignore information, they may
find it difficult to avoid thinking about information they want to ignore. Mental
contamination appears because the brain does not compartmentalize gathered
information. Then, this information may affect their judgment by influencing how
subsequent events are processed and which beliefs are formed. The strength of the
anchoring effect has been shown to be negatively correlated to the confidence the
evaluator has in its own assessment (i.e. “when people are not confident in their
judgments, they are more susceptible to anchoring effects”), a confidence which
Sunstein, Kahneman and Schkade believe to be low when awarding dollar amounts. 142
Anchoring has been empirically observed in many diverse fields. 143 Specifically
relating to the focus of this paper, Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich have produced three
separate studies on anchoring effects in federal magistrates, state and federal judges and
bankruptcy judges. 144 The first study was conducted over a sample of federal magistrate
judges who were asked to assess damages arising out an accident. They found that their
sample group is also subject to anchoring, 145 despite the fact that “judges are
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experienced, well-trained, and highly motivated decision makers”. 146 The second study, a
similar damage assessment case, was conducted over a sample of federal magistrates,
state and federal judges and tested anchoring effects with both low and high anchors.
They found that both anchors had a significant impact on the amount of damages
awarded. In the third study, bankruptcy judges faced a determination of interest rate in a
chapter 13 case. Although, the results were smaller, anchoring still had an impact on the
outcome. 147 To the best of my knowledge, there has not been any study yet connecting
anchoring to control related liability theories.

B. Damage Assessments: the Role of Anchoring
Despite the criticism voiced against strict liability when applied to controlling
lenders, it has been advanced as a way to reduce the problems presented by hindsight bias
in cases where “the technology of precaution is unilateral (in the sense that only the
potential injurer can realistically take action to reduce the probability or severity of an
accident)”. 148 Lender control liability appears to fit the bill, as usually only the
controlling lender is responsible for decisions affecting the outcome (i.e. whether to
liquidate or reorganize).
Theoretically, strict liability insulates injurers from the possibility of hindsight
bias because the party who may potentially damage another assesses the situation ex ante,
as he is always found liable, and doesn’t have to pay attention to ex post determinations
of probabilities. To see why, it is convenient to look at the standard unilateral tort model
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of law and economics. 149 In the model, there are two variables: injurers’ activity level z
(chosen by injurers) and the level of care x which they can engage in. The activity level
will generate benefit b(z) and the level of care generates a probability of harm p(x). In
addition, it is assumed that x represents the private cost of an injurer deriving from
prevention and that h, a fixed value, represents the possible damage caused by the injurer
each time an injurer engages in his activity.

Then, the social object would be to

maximize
b(z) – z(x + p(x)h)

(1)

which is advanced as the main rationale legal system should have. A potential injurer
then prefers to be judged by strict liability when there’s a possibility of hindsight bias, as
he erases the possibility that adjudicators determine that x generates a larger probability
of accident than it actually did. The potential injurer will know ex ante the values of x,
p(x) and h and therefore will maximize (1) without the need to pay attention to anything
else. Hence, efficient activity and care levels are taken irrespective of hindsight bias. 150
It doesn’t necessarily follow that strict liability should be applied to liability
assessments against controlling parties (as lenders) as a way to prevent hindsight bias.
Speaking of the functionally related BJR, Rachlinski considers that while it works as a
“no liability” rule it is as an efficient way to achieve a second best in dealing with
hindsight bias. 151 Rachlinski provides both “equitable and economic” reasons to use a no
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571, 619 (1998) (“have fewer adverse consequences than a rule of negligence judged in hindsight”). Jolls
and Susntein believe that this type of debiasing rules are of an invasive character, as entirely block choice
in the hope that legal outcomes will not fall prey to problems of bounded rationality and recommend the
adoption of a less intrusive method. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein “Debiasing through Law”, 35 J.
Legal Stud. 199, 202 (2006) (“Compared with the more common approach of insulating legal outcomes
from the effects of bounded rationality, a significant advantage of strategies for debiasing through law is
that they aim to correct errors while still preserving as much opportunity as possible for people to make
their own choices… An important corollary of choice-preserving strategies is that they help to address
boundedly rational behavior while avoiding the imposition of significant costs on those who do not exhibit
bounded rationality.”)
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liability rule in the case of the BJR. The later arguments refer to the disincentive that a
strict liability would pose on people to become firm’s managers and the incentives to take
excessive precautions, in turn undermining general economic activity. 152 The former
arguments focus on shareholders ability to fire managers directly or indirectly by selling
their stock, the limited amount of loss suffered by shareholders and their ability to
diversify their risk of loss.
Regardless of whether the Rachlinski’s BJR analysis can be extended to lender
control liability, 153 the inability to trust adjudicators on liability assessments is due to a
separate cause. Where lender control liability theories are involved, the superior
characteristic of strict liability in unilateral torts doesn’t apply due to the difference in the
formation of damage assessments. As it can be readily seen from the unilateral tort model
description, the level of damages is entirely independent from the level of care exercised
by the potential injurer, which in turn determines the probability of harm. This is not the
case for lender control liability theories. An example will help to show the difference.
Let’s assume that a controlling lender has 2 options 154 : he can either liquidate the
firm (obtaining a fixed amount L) or reorganize it. If he chooses the reorganization
option, he will incur for sure in reorganization costs C (i.e. negotiation costs, costs of
running the firm until a plan is approved, etc) and may obtain a favorable reorganization
value R+ with a probability p(R+) or an unfavorable reorganization value R- with
152

See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight”, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev.
571, 622-3 (1998)
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The “equitable” reasons provided by Rachlinski do not seem compelling for lender control liability on
firms formed partially with implicit contracts. First, as stock is not the only way to participate in the
“ownership” of the firm, then voting control has a limited disciplining power. In addition, because the firm
is in distress selling the stock (or claims) to sanction a controlling lender would have a very limited effect
(if any at all). Second, if there are firm specific investments, the magnitude of the loss could be higher (i.e.
in lost wages) than what was invested, frustrating for these actors the limited liability of corporations.
Third, firm specific investments are not easily diversifiable (i.e. you can’t make large numbers of firm
specific investments). The “economic” reasons may not deter a controlling lender. It is not clear what
comprises excessive precautions. As lender control liability can potentially generate costs which are
externalized to other constituents, it is not clear that today the optimal level of precautions is taken. I leave
the resolution of these issues for future research.
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In this example, I am assuming that there are no problems emerging from different classes of legal
claimholders and that relationship specific investments are not affected by the decision. Although I
recognize the unrealistic nature of these assumptions, using them will help us to focus on why strict
liability cannot help to insulate against the hindsight bias.
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probability p(R-). Therefore, a controlling lender decides on a course of action depending
on whether L is bigger or smaller than
R + ∗ p(R + ) + R − ∗ p(R − ) − C

(2)

Let’s assume, further, that the controlling lender chooses option L, the state of the
world that realizes is the favorable one (R+) and then he is sued under lender control
liability. If the adjudicator is to rule in favor of the plaintiff he will need to assess the
amount of damages (which by assumption are traceable to the controlling lender’s
decision). To accomplish the damage evaluation, the adjudicator needs to compare L to
its assessment of the ex ante result of reorganization, given by (2). Provided that the later
is bigger than the former, the controlling lender would have to pay damages equal to that
difference. 155 As L is fixed (whatever is obtained in the liquidation of the firm’s assets),
then the damage assessment will depend on the estimated value of the reorganization.
To obtain such a value, three values need to be estimated: the probabilities of each
state of the world occurring, the costs of restructuring and the value of reorganizations. It
is safe to assume that courts can estimate rather accurately restructuring costs due to their
extended experience in the subject. As we have seen before, probabilities would likely be
overestimated due to hindsight bias. Again, strict liability would prevent a controlling
lender from suffering ex ante excessive damages if this was the setting. But the estimate
of the reorganization value in different states of the world change the picture. In the
simple model presented above, R+ is given; R- needs to be assessed. Therefore, only if Ris assessed incorrectly, then strict liability may not limit the effects of cognitive biases. Rvalue may be overestimated not due to hindsight, as it is not a probability, but most likely
due to anchoring (produced by R+). 156
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We are abstracting here from any damages occurring out reliance in the behavior or words of the
controlling lender.
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Another possibility of bias may be due to representativeness heuristics (i.e. a great description of the
firm). See “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”, in Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., Cambridge University Press,
New York, NY (1982), p. 8.
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To sum up, a controlling lender may accurately estimate probabilities ex ante and
therefore avoid problems related to hindsight bias if strict liability is used. Nonetheless,
as other values need to be estimated (i.e. the value of the reorganized firm under other
states of the world) and these estimates are outside of his control (actually decide upon by
the adjudicator), strict liability may be an insufficient attempt to achieve an efficient
outcome. The efficiency of the outcome of a lender control liability case then depends not
just on hindsight bias but also on anchoring, their magnitude of the distortions and maybe
the effects of these two heuristics on each other, if any. 157
Recognizing the existence of the combined effects of hindsight bias and
anchoring is very important for practical adjudicating and legal policy debiasing
efforts. 158 Strategies geared to debias lender control liability adjudications need to pay
attention to both hindsight and anchoring. 159 Although both cognitive errors have proven
to be very resistant to attempts to limit them, some partial results were obtained using
different techniques for debiasing anchoring and hindsight bias. For example, applying a
“consider the opposite strategy” has been shown to reduce the anchoring effect 160 and a
smaller anchoring effect was found when decision makers were specialized (bankruptcy
judges and insurers). 161 In addition, suggested solutions to hindsight bias, as strict
liability or eliminating the adjudicator’s contact with some evidence 162 may not work in
the same way for anchoring.
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In relation to their experiment Kamin and Rachlinski discuss hindsight bias interaction with anchoring.
See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight”, 19
Law & Hum. Behav. 89, 101 (1995)
158
On the different debiasing techniques, see Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein “Debiasing through Law”,
35 J. Legal Stud. 199 (2006).
159
The point here is not about the different source these two effects, but about the different consequences
for legal policy. In fact, some authors believe that anchoring and the hindsight bias have the same cognitive
source. See Rüdiger Pohl, Markus Eisenhauer & Oliver Hardt “Sara: A Cognitive Process Model to
Simulate the Anchoring Effect and Hindsight Bias”, 11 Memory 337, 338 (2003)
160
See Thomas Mussweiler, Fritz Strack & Tim Pfeiffer “Overcoming the Inevitable Anchoring Effect:
Considering the Opposite Compensates for Selective Accessibility”, 26 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 1142, 1146
(2000)
161
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ,Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich “Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind”,
86 B.U.L. Rev. 1227, 1237 (2006); Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Insurers, Illusions of Judgment
& Litigation”, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 2017, 2022 (2006)
162
Wistrich, Guthrie and Rachlinski recommend to separate “managerial judging” from adjudication. See
Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?
The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding”, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1259 (2005) (“a judge who
supervises settlement discussions should not serve as the fact finder in the same case”)

37

VI. Conclusion
The central goal of this paper has been to functionally analyze the ubiquitous
problem of lender control by, first, tying it to modern economic understandings of what a
firm is, then, reestablishing a proper role for lender control liability theories, and, finally,
examining how cognitive errors may affect the adjudication of lender control liability
cases. Lender control liability theories have largely fallen in disuse by United States
courts. The implicit understanding of the theory of the firm by legal academics and courts
has made it possible. Broadening the scope of the theory of the firm permits a better
understanding that there is a role for lender liability theories besides mimicking the so
called absolute priority rule.
In addition, the paper serves to uncover that lender control liability theories are
not sufficient to correct all the inefficiencies arising out of allocating control to a lender.
Because allocation of control is not innocuous in chapter 11 reorganizations, some of the
effects it posses on ex ante relationship specific investors cannot be corrected by merely
penalizing a controlling lender without at the same time penalizing lender’s gain of
control. It is yet to be proven that a lender’s gain of control is inefficient. On the contrary,
the finance literature considers that lenders obtaining control contingent on some
imperfect signal is the more efficient state of affairs.
Finally, the paper has exposed that even though lender control may not be
optimal, cognitive errors may produce systematic distortions that challenge the
application of lender liability theories. Specifically, the paper uncovered that hindsight
bias is not the only heuristic which must be taken into account when thinking about
lender control liability application. Anchoring plays a substantive role which limits the
desirability of applying strict liability as a debiasing technique.
There are several avenues for future research, three of which I outline here. First,
as the theory of the firm shows that there may be value not captured by legal claims, it
would be interesting to investigate whether bankruptcy definition of claims should be
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enlarged to incorporate some of these economic factors today not accounted by
bankruptcy laws. Second, the relation between different heuristics used in control liability
adjudications seems to be a fruitful field for future research. Questions regarding the
potential influence of anchoring on hindsight bias or hindsight bias on anchoring or both
need to be answered to provide better policy recommendations. In addition, an
assessment of the overall effect of heuristics, given the individual variation on cognitive
errors, would be especially helpful. 163 Finally, it would be interesting to explore the
exactitude of the common assumption in the literature stating that control shifts to the
lender after covenant violations. 164 Such a study would help in assessing the magnitude
of the societal costs generated by refusing to accept the possibility of lender control costs.
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For discussions on individual variation, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Cognitive errors, Individual
Differences and Paternalism”, 73 U.Chi. L. Rev. 207 (2006); and, Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein
“Debiasing through Law”, 35 J. Legal Stud. 199 (2006)
164
See Stuart C. Gilson “Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders”, 27 Journal of Financial
Economics 355, 356 (1990) (“…models of bankruptcy often assume that creditors take control of the
bankrupt firm’s assets”); Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to
Financial Contracting”, 59 Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992).
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